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NOTES
PERSONAL INJURY RELEASE AND THE
MISTAKE OF FACT
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been stated that it is the policy of the law to
encourage parties to enter into out-of-court settlements and
releases.' In view of the large number of personal injury
claims that arise each year, to discourage release settlements
would delay litigation with unnecessary contests and increase
taxpayers' expense in supporting additional courts. Thus,
releases are encouraged irrespective of the parties reaching
a beneficial or detrimental agreement, provided they are
made in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake.
2
Personal injury releases differ from commercial releases,
yet they possess the same basic requirements of a contract.3
The personal injury release is based on a promise and is
usually supported by a consideration. This may be dispensed
with when the releases are mutual, or for a substituted per-
formance.4  The Statute of Frauds is also dispensed with
since it was intended to protect the defendant by ruling out
insidious claims, and since it is an affirmative defense, to
require the release to be in writing would protect the plaintiff
instead.6
Because personal injury releases relate to human interests
instead of commercial transactions they have developed as a
special body of contract law. 7  Since damages are not
always readily determinable, the diagnosis and prognosis of
an injury may be inaccurate as to existence, seriousness, or
1. Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579, 587 (1963); Wheeler
v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Ore., 229 Ore. 360, 366 P.2d 527, 530 (1961).
2. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 11 (3) (1937).
3. Matthews v. Atchinson T. & S. F. Ry., 129 P.2d 435 (Cal. Ct. App.
1942); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 385 (1), 402 (b) (c) (1932); RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 900, comment b (1939).
4. Havlghurst, Problems Concerning Settlement Agreements, 53 Nw.
-U.L. Rev. 283, 284 (1958).
5. See N.D. Cent. Code § 9-13-01 (1961) where releases are deemed
valid when supported by a consideration.
6. Havighurst, supra note 4, at 284.
7. Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 111, App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1957).
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consequences of an injury. This makes the personal injury
release lack the stability and finality of contract possessed
by the commercial release.8
II. THE GENERAL RELEASE
The personal injury release is usually taken from a "form
book", written in general terms, with all-inclusive coverage
relating to all injuries; past, present, and future2 The
majority view, which is the modern trend, tends to disregard
the all-inclusive wording of the release ° as well as the Parol
Evidence Rule." Instead, the courts look to see what the
parties actually intended the release to cover. As stated in
Ruggles v. Selby: 12
• . .most jurisdictions in this country - have refused
to permit any form of words, no matter how general
or all-encompassing, to foreclose the chancellor from
scrutinizing the release and the attendant circum-
stances to be sure that it was fairly made and
accurately reflected the intention of the parties.
Therefore, the true intent of the parties will be brought out
to determine if unknown or unsuspected injuries had been
anticipated.
1 3
It is usually held that no relief will be granted to the
releasor when the mistake pertains to the future rather than
to the past or the present. Because hindsight is better than
foresight, an individual should not be allowed to flaunt his
contract on the basis that his recovery did not occur as he
had expected. 14  The Nebraska court stated:
8. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania RtR., 153 F.2d 757, 764 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Concurring opinion); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2416 (3d ed. 1940).
Contra, Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Ore., 222 Ore. 360, 366
P.2d 527, 530 (1961).
9. E.g., Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579, 581 (1963);
Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733, 741 (1960) .. . a release
is as all-inclusive in its terms as legal ingenunity can make it..."; Denton,
v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537, 538, 540 (1957); See generally, L.
Jones, LEGAL FORMS §§ 26.1-26.49 (10th ed. 1962); MODERN LEGAL
FORMS §§ 7501-7630 (1957).
10. Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. ], 373 P.2d 1 (1962); Denton v. Utley,
supra nute 9; Simpson v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry.. 107 Neb. 779, 186 N.W. 1001
(1922).
11. Aronovitch v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1953).
12. 25 Ill. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733, 739-740 (1960).
13. Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1, 5 (1962); Reed v. Harvey,
253 Iowa 10, 110 N.W.2d 442 (1961); Larson v. Stowe, 228 Minn. 216, 36
N.W.2d 601, 603 (1949); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1551 (rev. ed. 1937).
14. De Witt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1957); Oakley v.
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What we believe to be the true rule is that the
mistake must relate to either a present or past fact
or facts that are material to the contract of settlement,
and not to an opinion as to future conditions as the
result of present known facts. A mistake as to the
future developments of a known injury is a matter
of opinion, and is not one of fact, and is not such a
mistake as will avoid a release; but, where the
mistake is as to the extent of the injury due to
unknown conditions or relates to injuries that were
wholly unknown, then the release may be avoided...15
Although modern courts have taken a liberal view in
rescinding personal injury releases they still impose a barrier
on the releasor by requiring that he prove his case with clear
and convincing evidence. This in turn reduces his chances
of breaking the release.1
6
Releases are rescinded on the basis of fraud,' 7 duress, 8
and mistake. 19  Of these three, mistake of fact is the most
unpredictable and may be sub-divided into three categories:
misrepresentation, unilateral mistake of fact, and mutual
mistake of fact.
A mistake has been defined as "some unintentional act,
omission, or error arising from ignorance, surprise, impo-
sition, or misplaced confidence", 2 or as another author has
stated, "It consists of doing something which, it afterwards
turns out, is wrong".
21
III. UNILATERAL MISTAKE
Unilateral mistake of fact occurs when the parties fail
to reach a "meeting of the minds" as to the effect of the
Duerbeck Co., 366 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Mo. 1963); Wheeler v. White Rock
Bottling Co. of Ore., 229 Ore. 360, 366 P.2d 527 (1961); Corbett v. Bonney,
202 Va. 933, 121 S.E.2d 474 (1961); But see, Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332.
86 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1957).
15. Simpson v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., 107 Neb. 779, 186 N.W. 1001,
1003 (1922); See also Goodman v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 S.W.2d 42 (Mo.
1958) where present fact was distinguished from future factual mistake;
3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 598 (1960).
16. Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1941); Patzke
v. Chesapeake & 0. R.R., 368 Mich. 190, 118 N.W.2d 286 (1962); Pope v.
Bailey-Marsh Co., 29 N.D. 355, 151 N.W. 18 (1914), eritlelzed, Gilmore v.
Western Elec. Co., 42 N.D. 206, 172 N.W. 111, 113 (1919).
17. Raynale v. Yellow Cab Co., 115 Cal. App. 90, 300 Pac. 991 (1931).
18. Erck v. Bachand, 69 S.D. 330, 10 N.W.2d 518 (1943).
19. Matthews v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 129 P.2d 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942).
20. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY at 1152 (4th ed. 1951).
21. Patterson. Equitable Relief For Unilateral Mistake, 28 Col. L. Rev.
859, 860 (1928).
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contract as held by one of the parties, and not by the other.22
Most courts refuse recovery in the case of a unilateral mistake
of fact, 23 however, the Michigan court reasoned that the
distinction between unilateral and mutual mistake of fact
should be eliminated. They held that recovery should not
be allowed or disallowed on the basis of unilateral or mutual
mistake of fact, but rather on all the circumstances leading
to the release. 24
In Casey v. Proctor,25 where the releasor negotiated and
signed a release for all damages, and later sought to rescind
the release on the discovery of serious personal injury, the
court said:
. . . the failure of the plaintiff to recognize that the
release included a discharge of liability for personal
injuries has been held to be attributable to his own
neglect ...
Thus, his failure to read, or to understand the release
constitutes negligence and will not allow rescission.
26
In another unilateral case, that of Ricketts v. Penn-
sylvania R. R., 27 the court allowed a release to be broken
for ,a non-negligent unilateral mistake of fact. 28  The
releasor, having been misinformed as to the content of the
release by his attorney, thought the release pertained only
to back wages and tips. This misinformation, along with the
accident-induced trauma, resulted in his failure to read the
release. The concurring opinion in Ricketts, advocates that
the distinction between unilateral and mutual mistake of fact
be eliminated, because it complicates and confuses the issues.
The opinion also holds that the personal injury release should
be treated like "seamen releases" under the Federal Mari-
time Act, 29 where the burden of proving the validity of the
release is on the releasee. Citing the United States Supreme
22. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY at 1701 (4th ed. 1951).
23. Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Il1. App. 2d 288, 155 N.E.2d 827 (1959);
Gumberts v. Greenberg, 124 Ind. App. 138, 115 N.E.2d 504 (1953).
24. Denton V. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1957). Contra,
Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953); See Schoenfeld v.
Buker, 262 Minn. 122, 114 N.W.2d 560 (1962).
25. 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579, 583 (1963) (Court held for Plaintiff
on other grounds).
26. Id. at 584.
27. 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946) (Concurring opinion).
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Court in Garrett v. Moore McCormack,3" the concurring
opinion also states:
The Supreme Court . . . has broadly hinted that the
courts should treat non-maritime employees, with
respect to personal injury claims, just as they treat
seamen.3
1
IV. MISREPRESENTATION OF FACT
A misrepresentation of fact is similar to a unilateral
mistake of fact, except that the latter is usually the mistake
of the releasor. The misrepresentation of fact is classically
the result of information furnished to the releasor by the
releasee or his agent, such as an insurance claim agent or
a physician. Because the releasor relied upon this inform-
ation in signing the release, he was subsequently damaged. 2
Courts have been liberal in voiding releases founded on such
circumstances, 3 3 but again require that the misrepresentation
must be material and not extrinsic or collateral to the issues.
3 4
The failure of the releasee or his agent to communicate
information to the releasor, who has subsequently relied
thereon, also has been a basis for rescission of the release.3 5
Under the preceding circumstances courts have been
reluctant to refer to the misrepresentations. as fraud. Since
the misrepresentations were innocent in nature they are
referred to as a constructive fraud.3 6
The key questions when examining releases involving
possible misrepresentations of fact are: who made the mis-
representation; who did he represent; and was there
28. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 95A (rev. ed. 1937).
29. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1915, amend 1920); For cases hereunder, see annot.
46 U.S.C.A. § 688 n. 114-116 (1958), and n. 114 (Supp. 1963).
30. 317 U.S. 239, 248 (1942).
31. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1946).
32. Graham v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 176 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1949); Great
No. R.R. v. Fowler, 136 Fed. 118, 121 (9th Cir. 1905); see Jordan v. Brady.
Transfer & Storage Co., 226 Iowa 137, 284 N.W. 73 (1939); Denton v. Utley,
350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537 (1957) (Dictum).
33. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Peterson. 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac. 406, 410
(1928); Bass v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 20 Ga. 458, 53 S.E.2d 895 (1949).
34. Early v. Martin, 331 Ill. App. 55, 72 N.E.2d 562 (1947); Jordan v.
Brady Transfer & Storage Co., 226 Iowa 137, 284 N.W. 73 (1939).
35. Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 540 (1957).
36. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Peterson, 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac. 406 (1928);
Jacobson v. Chicago M. & St. P. RB.R., 132 Minn. 181, 156 N.W. 251 (1916);
Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381, 388 (1953); Havighurst,
The Effect Upon the Settlement of Mutual Mistakes as to InJuries, 12 Def.
L.J. 1, 8 (1963).
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reliance on the misrepresentation. Courts are reluctant to
rescind a release where the misrepresentation does not
amount to a positive statement of fact or valued medical
opinion, but instead is merely speculative. 37  If the mis-
representation to the releasor was made by his own agent
or physician, rather than the releasee's agent or physician,
the majority of the courts are hesitant to allow the release
to be broken. 3  Some courts allow recovery where the
misrepresentation was made by the releasor's physician and
relied thereon by both parties.
3 9
The releasor must also show he had a right to rely on
the innocent misrepresentation and his reliance thereon was
detrimental to him.
4 0
V. MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT
Modern courts have been liberal in rescinding personal
injury releases when the releases pertain to a genuine mutual
mistake of fact.41  It has been held that to grant a rescission
for a mutual mistake of fact the mistake of the parties must
pertain to past or present material facts and should not relate
to facts pertaining to future events that amount to speculative
opinion, prophesy, or "puffing".
42
Mutual mistake of fact applies to the nature and extent
of the injuries, irrespective of the wording of the release,
assuming the parties did not intend the release to cover all
known and unknown injuries.4 3  Courts usually regard the
37. Corbett v. Bonney, 202 Va. 933, 121 S.E.2d 476 (1961); See Reed v.
Harvey, 253 Iowa 10, 110 N.W.2d -142 (1961).
38. De Witt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1957): Accord,
Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381, 388 (1953).
39. Doyle v. Teasdale, supra note 37, at 387; see also Jordan v. Brady
Transfer & Storage Co., 226 Iowa 137, 284 N.\
r
. 73, 82 (1939) where the
court stated:
Whether the doctor making the mistaken diagnosis was the
doctor of the plaintiff, or the doctor of the defendant, is im-
material, if it was a good faith diagnosis, and was in good
faith relied upon.
40. Kelley v. Salt Lake Transp. Co.. 100 Utah 436, 116 P.2d 383, 385
(1941).
41. Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963); Ruggles v.
Selby, 25 Il1. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (1960): Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill.
App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957); Denton v. UTtley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d
537 (1957). Contra, Wheeler v. White Rock Dottling Co. of Ore., 229 Ore.
360, 366 P.2d 527 (1961).
42. Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill..App. 2d 288. 155 N.E.2d 827 (1959);
Schoenfeld v. Iluker, 262 Minn. 122, 114 N.V.2d 560 (1962); Accord, Central
of Ga. Ry. v. Ramsey, 151 So. 2d 725 (Ga. 1963).
43. Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579 (1963): Thomas v.
Hollowell, suiprz note 42; Larson v. Stowe, 228 Minn. 216, 36 N.A.2d 601
(1949); See B3ollinger v. Randall, 184 Pa. Super. 644, 135 A.2d 802 (1957).
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mutual mistake of fact as a basis of rescission, for they
surmise that no individual would enter into a full and complete
release of all claims unless he knew of all injuries and had
been specifically compensated. 4
In the case of Clancy v. Pacenti,4 the releasor and
releasee entered into the release on the basis of medical
information furnished by both the releasor's and the releasee's
physicians. The physicians at that time found that the
releasor had suffered no injury. Later, when the releasor
suffered severe back pain attributable to the original incident,
the release was broken for mutual mistake of fact. The
parties were unaware of the nature and extent of the injuries
when the release was signed, and a mutual mistake of fact
prevailed as to the existence of the injury. The court's
reasoning was:
• . .mistakes are easily made and the consequences
are more serious than in any other of the affairs of
man. A slight abrasion may mean nothing or it
may lead to a malignancy.
46
In Dansby v. Buck,47 the releasor suffered a minor knee
injury, which was later discovered to be a serious fracture.
The release Was voided for mutual mistake of fact because
the mistake was to the nature and seriousness of the injury. 48
In analyzing a mutual mistake of fact in the personal
injury release, it is important to ascertain just what the
parties had intended the release to cover, as well as what
factual information was available to the parties. 49  What
44. Great No. R.R. v. Reid, 245 Fed. 86, 89' (9th Cir. 1917); Aronovitch
v. Levy, 238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570 (1953); Larson v. Stowe, supra note 43.
45. 15 Il. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957).
46. Id. at 805; Accord, Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537
(1957). Contra, Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Ore., Pq 9 Ore. 360.
366 P.2d 527 (1961).
47. 92 Ariz 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962).
48. Id., Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 I1. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957); Hall
v. Storm Constr. Co., 368 Mich. 253, 118 N.W.2d 281 (1962).
49. Larson v. Stowe, 228 -Minn. 216, 36 N.W.2d 601, 603 (1949), where
the court reasoned:
The existance of injuries of such a character that reasonable
parties could not have entered into the agreement except
through error is an element that weighs heavily against the
finality of all-inclusive language.
But see Page v. Means, 192 F. Supp. 475, (N.D. W. Va. 1961); See
also cases cited note 41 supra.
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the parties intended when they entered into the release is
usually a question of fact for the jury. 50
VI. COLLATERAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Considered with the previously stated requirements of
breaking releases for mistakes of fact is the question of
liability of the parties as to the original injury. Many times
releases are signed in favor of releasors to relieve the burden
of "nuisance suits". Courts in scrutinizing a release try to
determine who would be liable in the absence of a release
and if any oppression would result if the release is permitted
to stand. 51
In addition to examining releases for mistakes, most
courts consider certain collateral circumstances52 which
include: the nature of the injury; 53 the intelligence and
bargaining power of the parties; 4 the adequacy of the
consideration; 55 presence of counsel; G and the time lapse
between the date of injury and the date of the release.
7
These elements are considered when examining the release
to determine if it was obtained by "over-reaching", resulting
in an improvident settlement. Juries have frequently found
release settlements improvident, for after the release has
been broken the jury awards have been much higher than
the release settlements58
50. Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1 (1962); Aronovitch v. Levy,
238 Minn. 237, 56 N.W.2d 570 (1953).
51. Dansby v. Buck, supra note 50, at 5; Hudson v. Thies, 35 Ill. App.
2d 189, 182 N.E.2d 760 (1962); Schoenfeld v. Buker, 262 Minn. 122, 114 N.W.2d
560 (1962).
52. Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537, 543 (1957); Caudill
v. Chatham Mfg. Co., 258 N.C. 99, 128 S.E.2d 128, 132-133 (1962); Havig-
hurst, supra note 36, at 17.
53. Dansby v. Buck, 92 Ariz. 1, 373 P.2d 1. (1962); Clancy v. Pacenti. 15
Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1957).
54. Reed v. Harvey, 253 Iowa 10, 110 N.W.2d 442, 446 (1961); Denton
v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537, 543 (1957).
55. Casey v. Proctor, 28 Cal. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579, 583 (1963); Sulli-
van v. Elgin J. & E. Ry., 331 Ill. App. 613, 73 N.E.2d 632 (1947); Fraser v.
Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953, 956 (1941).
56. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946); Schoen-
feld v. Buker, 262 Minn. 122, 114 N.W.2d 560, 566 (1962).
57. Jordan v. Guerra, 144 P.2d 349, 353 (Cal. 1943); Hall v. Strom
Constr. Co., 368 Mich. 253, 118 N.V.2d 281 (1962).
58. Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946) (Release-
$750, Jury award-$7,500); Ruggles v. Selby, 25 111. App. 2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733
(1960) (Release-$900, Jury award-$38,000); Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d
171, 145 N.E.2d 802 (1957) (Release-$150, Jury award-$22,500); Goodman
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. 1958) (Release-$455, Jury award-
$13,000).
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VII. NORTH DAKOTA STATUTES
North Dakota, in regulating releases, has provided by
statute that releases may be broken for fraud, duress, and
mistake.5 9  The Code also provides that a general release
does not apply to claims not known or suspected by the
releasor at the time of settlement, which, if had been known
would have materially affected his settlement.60
The North Dakota legislature has also provided that
personal injury releases obtained within thirty days of the
injury will be held voidable by the releasor if he should elect
to do so within six months from the date of the injury.
61
The North Dakota statute does not prevent the parties
from entering into a release agreement, but does allow the
injured person, or his representative, to hold the release
voidable within the prescribed time limit. It is apparent that
the statute is an attempt of the legislature to curb "ambulance
chasing tactics" used by some unscrupulous attorneys and
over-zealous claim agents. In the leading case of Peterson
v. Panovitz,62 the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:
If contracts are so made they remain in force until
rescinded. If fair and honest, such contracts prob-
ably will not be avoided; if avoided by the injured
party, the rights of the parties thereto will be
controlled by applicable legal principles.
VIII. JUDICAL ATTITUDES
Is is contended by the minority jurisdictions that rescission
of personal injury releases for other than fraud and duress
would open the "floodgates" to litigation.63 They envisage
the abandonment of the objective theory of contract, for no
release would be final until the statute of limitations had run
its course.
64
59. N.D. Cent Code § 9-09-02 (1961); See Clark v. Northern Pac. R.R..
36 N.D. 503, 162 N.W. 406 (1917) and Fedorenko v. Rudman, 71 N.W.2d
332 (N.D. 1955) for interpretation thereof.
60. N.D. Cent. Code § 9-13-02 (1961).
61. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 9-08-08, 09 (1961); See Peterson v. Panovitz, 62
N.D. 328, 243 N.W. 798 (1932) for interpretation thereof.
62. 62 N.D. 328, 243 N.W. 798, 801-802 (1932).
63. Reinhardt v. Wilbur, 30 N.J. Super. 502, 105 A.2d 415, 416-417 (1954);
Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Ore., 229 Ore. 360, 366 P.2d 527.
530 (1961).
64. Wheeler v. White Rock Bottling Co. of Ore., supra note 63, at 530.
1963]
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If the rule were otherwise, no release could be safely
accepted in personal injury matters. The end result
would be that all such claims would be forced into
litigation. Such a conclusion would be directly
contrary to the policy of the law favoring amicable
settlement of disputes and the avoidance of liti-
gation.
65
Minority jursdictions further contend that since the
parties are free to enter into their own agreements, the terms
of the release should stand unless a patent ambiguity exists.
They reason that the question of an improvident settlement
should not be of paramount importance since the parties
should accept the risk involved in a complete release and be
bound accordingly.
6
The majority of the courts, on the other hand, hold that
releases should be broken for mistakes of fact because of the
all-important human considerations involved in bodily injuries.
As long as the particular injury was not contemplated or
compensated for, it would be a gross injustice to hold the
parties to the original agreement.
6 7
It is contended that the objective theory of contract
should give way when it is obvious that an injustice has
resulted. The Ricketts case stated:
Fortunately, most judges are too common-sensible
to allow, for long, a passion for aesthetic elegance,
or for the appearance of an abstract consistency,
to bring about obviously unjust results.
6 8
It is also contended that the release should fail for obvious
injustices when the releasee is an insurance underwriter.
They have been fully compensated to accept the risk to the
65. De Witt v. Miami Transit Co., 95 So. 2d 898, 901 (Fla. 1957).
66. In De Witt v. Miami Transit Co., Supra note 65, at 901 the court
stated:
We confess that the situation . . . inspires our sympathies.
However, we have no power to adjudicate . . . on emotional
bases.
See Thomas v. Hollowell, 20 Ill. App. 2d 288, 155 N.E.2d 827 (1959):
Bollinger v. Randall, 184 Pa. Super. 644, 135 A.2d 802 (1957).
67. Clancy v. Pacenti, 15 Ill. App. 2d 171, 145 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1957);
Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.V.2d 537, 541-543 (1957).
68. 153 F.2d 757, 764 (2d Cir. 1946).
69. Casey V. Proctor, 28 Cal.. Rptr. 307, 378 P.2d 579, 587-588 (1963);
Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537, 541 (1957).
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limits of the policy, therefore strict enforcement of releases
would result in an unjust enrichment to the insurers by per-
mitting evasion of liability they assumed under the policy.
The most over-riding policy consideration for breaking
personal injury releases for mistakes of fact is the aspect
of the social burden. Too many times the results of harsh,
unfair, and improvident releases reveal themselves on the
relief rolls of society, either as a support payment or as
rehabilitation services. 70  Consequently, the courts have
adopted an "unwritten policy" whereby the ultimate liability
is preferably allowed to fall on private capital rather than
public funds.
IX. CONCLUSION
It is elementary that mistakes of fact may arise in near
infinite combinations when dealing with injuries and degen-
erations of the human anatomy. Because of the growing
consideration of this human element it is easier to break a
release for a mistake of fact today than it has been in the
past, especially in the federal courts. Courts today are
seeking out ways to circumvent normally valid releases when
they discern that the intention of the parties has not been
accurately reflected in the agreement. As stated in the
Denton case: "We exist solely to do justice and it shall be
done". 71
If personal injury releases are to maintain a high degree
of stability and finality it appears that it is the burden of
the releasee to make certain that all necessary facts have
been completely exposed to the parties, and that the actual
intention of the parties is as all-inclusive as the wording of
the release itself. Thus, where the release has been fairly
and honestly obtained, the releasee should be afforded a high
degree of protection. However, it seems apparent that the
70. Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App. 2d 733, 741 (1960) The court stated:
... compelling need for immediate cash provides an economic
compulsion that may lead to hasty and improvident settle-
ments . . . by reason of the special interest of the public in
preventing injured persons from unnecessarily becoming bur-
dens upon society in consequence of their improvident settle-
ment . . .
71. Denton v. Utley, 350 Mich. 332, 86 N.W.2d 537, 541 (1957).
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432 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 39
liberal rescission of the personal injury release, where
justifiable circumstances prevail, is the only acceptable
manner of handling releases involving mistakes of fact.
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